Some Risks of China’s Dual-Use Export Ban
China’s recent decision to impose a dual-use export ban targeting Japan is often discussed in terms of supply chains, technology controls, and security risks.
However, beyond the immediate economic impact, this policy carries a less obvious but potentially more strategic risk: its indirect effects on Taiwan–Japan relations.
This article explores three structural risks embedded in the design of the ban.
1. Taiwan-to-Japan exports may fall into a gray zone
Although the export ban is formally directed only at Japan, its scope becomes ambiguous when Taiwan is involved.
From China’s official perspective, Taiwan is not treated as a fully separate political entity.
As a result, dual-use goods manufactured or exported from Taiwan—such as electronic components, semiconductor-related hardware, or even consumer-grade PC parts—can be framed as Chinese-origin technologies routed through Taiwan.
This creates a situation where:
• Taiwan exporting dual-use goods to Japan
• can be interpreted by China
• as a de facto circumvention of its Japan-targeted export restrictions.
Whether such an interpretation is accepted internationally is secondary.
What matters is that the claim itself is structurally possible.
2. Taiwan may be forced into a strategic choice
If China signals—formally or informally—that Taiwan–Japan exports could be viewed as violations, Taiwan faces an uncomfortable dilemma.
• Continue exporting to Japan and risk friction with China
• Or limit Japan-bound exports to avoid political escalation
In other words, Taiwan may be pushed toward a forced alignment problem:
choosing economic stability with China versus deepening cooperation with Japan.
Importantly, this pressure does not require an explicit Chinese sanction against Taiwan.
Even the possibility of repercussions is often enough to alter corporate and governmental behavior.
3. Friction between Japan and Taiwan is the real success condition
From a strategic standpoint, China does not need to fully halt trade flows to achieve its objective.
The policy succeeds if:
• Taiwanese firms hesitate or delay shipments to Japan
• Japanese firms perceive Taiwan-related procurement as politically risky
• Trust and predictability in Taiwan–Japan supply chains weaken
If Japan and Taiwan begin to quietly reassess each other as sources of political risk, even without open conflict, the export ban has already achieved a key outcome.
In this sense, the measure functions less as a traditional trade restriction and more as a relationship-stressing mechanism.
Conclusion
China’s dual-use export ban targeting Japan carries risks that go beyond economics or security classifications.
• Taiwan-to-Japan exports may be interpreted as problematic under China’s framing
• Taiwan could be pressured into choosing between Japan and China
• And if Japan–Taiwan relations develop even small cracks, the policy can be considered strategically successful
The most significant impact of this measure may not be what it blocks—but what it quietly destabilizes.